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My aim in this brief paper is not to argue the case for or against privatisation, but 
rather to comment on the likely financial implications of some of the options. 
Nevertheless, it does not seem possible to do this without briefly reviewing the 
advantages and disadvantages that are claimed to flow h m  privatisation. I will 
then consider the existing organisation and financial performance of British Rail. 
Following this, I will discuss alternative ways of achieving the necessary level of 
profitability for private investors to be interested in owning and operating the 
railway system. 
2. FOR AND AGAINST PRIVATIATION 
The case in favour of privatisation is usually cast in terms of greater incentives both 
to innovate and provide better services, and to reduce operating costs through 
increased efficiency. I believe there is little argument that these incentives are 
strongest where the private company concerned is free of external regulation, but 
faces intense competition in the markets in which it is producing and selling. 
Nevertheless, competition in the capital market provides incentives to maximise 
profits even where competition i the product market is less strong. However, profit 
maximisation in this case may take the form of pricing up and reducing quality of 
service. Government may then intervene with controls on prices and service quality. 
But such controls are not easy to enforce, whilst if there is any indication that price 
rises will automatically be permitted to allow the company a reasonable rate of 
r e t m  then the incentive to efficient operation is weakened. Whilst in the short 
term, regulation of the RP1 minus X variety (ie allowing price increases at the rate 
of inflation less an allowance for anticipated productivity increases) may reduce this 
risk, it has been argued that in the long term - given the need to ensure that the 
company earns enough to be able to invest and stay in business - such a system of 
regulation almost inevitably reverts to rate of return regulation. 
Arguments against privatisation may be grouped into two categories. Firstly 
arguments against private ownership per se are usually couched in terms of the 
social obligations of the railway. The question here is whether such social 
obligations are desirable, and if they are, whether they can be adequately and 
efficiently provided for by contractual arrangements with private operators or by 
regulation. Secondly come arguments regarding the appropriate organisation of 
railway activities. If the advantages of privatisation require competition, and yet 
any organisation which provides for competition loses economies of scale and 
benefits of integration of the services of the various companies, then it is argued 
that the supposed benefits of privatisation are illusory, or could only be achieved at 
an unacceptable cost in other reap&. 
3. CURRENT BR ORGANISATION 
Let me now consider the question of organisation in more detail. British Rail is 
currently divided into five sectors - Inter City, Network Southeast and Provincial 
being the passenger sectors, with Freight and Parcels as non-passenger (there is a 
sixth sector, European passenger services, but it does not yet have any revenue). 
However, sector (and within those subsector) managers are only responsible for the 
planning and marketing of services within their control. The actual operation of the 
services is undertaken by a separate operations function, which is divided 
geographically on a region and area basis. The relationship between sectors and 
operations is essentially a contractual one, although with the sectors being required 
to negotiate with a monopoly supplier. Efficient operation of services relies on the - 
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pressure of financial targets and constraints rather than the force of competition 
between suppliers. 
It is well known that BR is currently hrther reviewing its organisation, with a view 
to decentralising operations on a sector, rather than a regional basis. Under such 
an organisation, the sectors would effectively become separate companies each with 
their own infrastructure, stations, rolling stock and operating staff. In other words, 
the trend of recent years of allocating staff and assets more clearly to individual 
sectors and subsectors would be taken to its ultimate conclusion. 
Such a change is widely seen as paving the way for privatisation on a sector by 
sector basis, and indeed it now seems almost certain that if privatisation goes ahead 
that will be the form it will take (perhaps with Provincial being split into a number 
of geographically based companies). In what follows, I will concentrate on the 
financial implications of this form of privatisation. In terms of the above discussion, 
however, it should be noted that a sector by sector privatisation is not likely to lead 
to a large amount of competition within the railway industry (only the infrastructure 
plus operating companies option would be likely to achieve that) and that some loss 
of economies of scale through the various sectors needing to develop their own 
facilities in the same locations is possible. The latter will only happen, however, if 
sensible contracts for one sector to provide facilities or services for another cannot 
be worked out. 
It is this issue that leads to the greatest complexities in considering how a system 
of separately privatised sectors would work. For the sectors do remain 
interdependent to a considerable degree. Take, for instance, the city I come from, 
Leeds. 
The station is deemed to be a Provincial station, because the majority of trains and 
passengers using it belong to that sector. Inter City currently pays the avoidable 
cost of its trains using the station - that is for any extra staff or facilities which 
would be avoided if Inter City ceased to operate from Leeds. But if Provincial were 
a separate privately owned company, presumably it would have an incentive to put 
up its charges to Inter City for the use of Leeds station until either it had creamed 
off all the profits Inter City makes in Leeds, or had put the charges so high that 
Inter City was considering building its own separate station. 
On the other hand, the main line into Leeds from Doncaster, which carries the 
service from London, currently belongs to Inter City. Provincial runs local services 
over the route, which is also used by Freight and Parcels trains, all on an avoidable 
cost basis. In this case, Inter City would have an incentive to cream off all the 
profits the other sectors were able to make (in the case of local services, judging the 
maximum the PTE would be willing to pay before removing its support for them). 
The situation described in this example is not peculiar to West Yorkshire; it would 
be replicated all over the country. In other words, what would be created by a 
sector by sector privatisation is a whole series of local monopoly situations, each one 
of which would lead to complex bargaining. In its proposed reorganisation, BR 
seems to be relying on a "balance of power" between the sectors to ensure that 
sensible deals are struck, plus the threat of intervention from the central "holding 
company" if that proved inadequate. In a privatised situation, it seems likely that a 
regulatory body would be needed to police the provision of access to monopolised 
facilities, as well as to ensure compatible and adequate technical and safety 
standards. 
I think that this example serves to show some of the regulatory complexities. What, - 
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then, of the financial attractiveness of BR to private investors. This rests on 'three 
issues: profitability of rail services themselves, prospects for property development 
and availability of subsidies. 
4. IMPROVING SECTOR FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
What are the prospects of improving the financial performance of the sectors 
sufficiently to attract private investors? Much depends on the degree to which the 
change of ownership itself leads to innovations wbich reduce costs or raise revenue, 
and the following discussion reflects my view that, in the absence of effective 
competition within the industry, that will not be a major factor. 
Of the five sectors, none yet earns what might be regarded as a fully commercial 
return on its assets, although Inter City and Freight both showed a profit last year 
(Figure 1). Network Southeast has the target of operating without subsidy by 
1992193, whilst for Provincial as a whole any thought of operation without subsidy is 
inconceivable. In the long term, it is intended that the commercial sectors should 
earn at least the standard public sector 8% real rate of return on all their assets, 
including infrastructure and property holdings. Even this would probably not be an 
attractive rate of return for a private investor. 
The market for rail passenger services has been buoyant in the last few years 
(Figure 2), although it is very sensitive to the state of the economy and is already 
being affected by the slowdown in consumer spending. In the case of Inter City, the 
mean price elasticity of demand appears to be about 1.2, indicating that a general 
rise in real fares does not add to revenue, and only makes sense as a way of 
constraining growth in demand (especially at peaks) in order to avoid costs. 
Demand is also very sensitive to the quality of service, and the current Inter City 
strategy is to increase demand by further quality improvements, taking the benefits 
partly in increased volumes and partly in increased fares. There seems no 
particular reason to expect this strategy to change dramatically if the business were 
privatised, although there may be a greater tendency to concentrate on the 'core' 
services at the expense of the peripheral ones. 
The position of Network Southeast is rather different. Two thirds of its traffic 
consists of London commuters, who represent something of a captive market. 
Although some studies have suggested that NSE t d c  is more price and quality 
sensitive than is often thought, especially in the longer run when the location 
decisions of new entrants to the commuting market may be influenced, there is little 
doubt that this sector could be made more profitable by carrying a reduced volume 
at much higher fares. This would also have the attraction of removing the need for 
expensive measures to expand the capacity of the rail infrastructure in the London 
are. Whether deliberate measures to reduce rail commuting into London would be 
seen as socially desirable, involving as they must some combination of increasing 
road traffic and reduction in the number of jobs in Central London, seems more 
questionable. In this sector, price and service quality regulation is almost certain to 
be necessary, whilst he possibility of continuing subsidies andlor capital grants 
cannot be ruled out. If the government persists in its plans to make this sector 
commercially viable, of course many of the same changes will take place even in 
public ownership. 
The Provincial sector contains the biggest variety of types of rail service of any of 
the passenger sectors, ranging from moderately profitable interurban and cross 
country services, through urban commuter services to highly unprofitable rural ones. 
Although its costs have been greatly reduced by the introduction of modern diesel 
multiple units in recent years - a process which is not yet complete - and there may 
- - 
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remain some scope for improving profitability by reducing costs and increashg 'fares, 
the principal issue in this sector is the future level and form of subsidies. 
Within the freight and parcels sectors, the principal financial problems surround the 
non-bulk freight operations run by Railfreight Distribution. The opening of the 
Channel Tunnel, offering the sort of lengths of haul at which such services can be 
profitable, can be expected to relieve these problems, and the organisation is likely 
to concentrate increasingly on long haul European intermodal and deepsea container 
operation, with domestic traffic only being carried where it is sensibly 
complementary to these markets. 
5. PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT 
Despite the large scale sales of recent years, British Rail still owns a great deal of 
property, operational and non-operational, as indicated by the level of the gross 
income h m  letting (Figure 3). One of the first suggestions that British Rail might 
be a candidate for privatisation - from Beesley and Littlechild in 1983 - saw the 
prospect of privatisation as resting entirely on the value of the property assets, with 
any train services remaining after privatisation being provided as a result of a 
continuing public service obligation. 
Certainly the property holdings of BR could prove attractive to developers, although 
any obligation to continue to run train services would tend to decrease that 
attraction. Even within the profitable sectors of BR, we have seen that running rail 
services is not likely to earn profits comparable to those to be made &om property 
development. Thus where the two aims conflict, it is likely to be the rail service 
that suffers. 'Whilst it may be true that in some cases - particularly in London - 
development of rail services and of property may be seen as complementary (as in 
Japan, where private rail companies have combined the two successfully for many 
years), elsewhere in the country, where rail is not likely to be seen as an important 
mode of transport to new developments, there is less chance of this happening. The 
case of privatised bus companies, which have shown considerable haste to convert 
their property holdings to more protitable uses than running buses, is a good 
example. Overall, whether relying on a reluctant property company to provide a rail 
service yields a good quality service seems doubtful. 
6. SUBSIDY 
In recent years, British Rail has experienced an enormous reduction in subsidies, 
without any major reductions in services - indeed passenger t ain miles have gone 
up (Figure 4). Nevertheless, it seems clear that if anything like the existing pattern 
of local rail services is to survive, then there will be a continued need for subsidy. 
Given the reluctance of both local and central government to see large scale rail 
closures, it therefore seems important to ensure that any new arrangements are 
compatible with the efficient administration of subsidies. 
For a private company to take wer the Provincial sector - or a large part of it - 
without some assurance of the level and duration of subsidies for it would seem to 
be a risky business. On the other hand, if governments really are so reluctant to 
see rail closures, then ownership of the infrastructure on which rail services are run 
could again confer a very real degree of monopoly. Perhaps protection for both 
parties - at least temporarily - could be obtained by the negotiation of a long term 
contract at the time of privatisation. But this seems incompatible with what surely 
must be another sensible objective - to decentralise the administration of subsidies 
to make it more clear exactly what services the government is buying at what price, 
perhaps with greater local government involvement. It is also not clear what 
- - 
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protection is afforded in the longer term. 
It is with respect to local services that competitive tendering may have a role to 
play. Indeed competitive tendering for the contract to run train services on a 
particular route already exists on a small scale in a number of countries. In 
Sweden, which has already gone down the path of separation of i&astructure from 
operations, it is understood that a bus company has won the contract for operation 
of the local train service in one area. But this is in the context of continued 
government ownership both of the infrastructure and rolling stock, the latter being 
leased to the operating company. It may be that some such arrangement, with 
continued government ownership of the assets, is the only way in which 
privatisation of the Provincial sector would be a practical proposition. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Of the various privatisation models for BR, the one that seems most likely to be 
implemented is privatisation on a sector by sector basis. However, we have seen 
that this is by no means a simple matter. The sectaw remain very interdependent, 
and complex negotiations in which each sector possesses considerable monopoly 
power in particular circumstances will be needed to determine the hancial 
relationships between them. Whether one can rely on a balance of monopoly power 
to lead to socially desirable outcomes seems quite doubtful, so it would seem that 
these negotiations would need to be subject o regulation to ensure reasonable access 
to the idi-astructure for each sector at an appropriate price. In any case regulation 
of technical and safety standards would continue to be necessary. 
In any privatisation of BR, the government seems likely to seek to reduce 
continuing subsidy requirements to a minimum. This would undoubtedly imply 
higher fares and lower volumes of tr&c on the London commuter network, 
although less change from the existing situation elsewhere. In the Provincial sector, 
continuing subsidies would undoubtedly be needed, but it is difficult to see how to 
administer these so that private ownership of the sector is attractive whilst there 
remains a flexibility for central or local government o buy the services it wants and 
an incentive for the operator to supply these at the minimum price. Perhaps 
continued public ownership of the system, but with competitive tendering for the 
contract to operate the services, is the most likely solution here. 
FIGURE l 
BR FINANCIAL RESULTS 
BY SECTOR 1988189 (£m) 
Revenue Cost Profit* 
Inter City 803 746 57 
Network 
South East 892 1030 -138 
Provincial 274 740 -466 
Freight 681 612 69 
Parcels 126 138 -12 
* Before interest and government grant 
Source: BR Annual Report and Accounts 1988189 
FIGURE 2 
RAIL TRAFFIC 1978-88 
Inter Prov- 
City Network incial Freight 
pass SE pass pass km tonnes 
km (b) km (b) (b) (m) 
Source: Transport Statistics Great Britain, 1978-88 
FIGURE 3 









Total Grant (£m) 1030 1191 607 
Passenger route-miles 8955 8932 8891 
Passenger miles (m) 19000 18350 21327 
Fare per passenger mile (p) 7.61 8.07 8.35 
Passenger stations 2365 2363 2426 
Passenger train miles (m) 196 203 222 
Source: British Railways Board, Annual Reports and 
Accounts 
